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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, pragmatists and language for specific purposes (LSP) 
researchers have endeavoured to shift the focus of language study from the 
characterisation of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic potentials of linguistic 
systems to the analysis of how people communicate in the different domains of 
knowledge and practice. The debate has provided convincing evidence for the 
inclusion of cognitive and pragmatic strands in discourse and text analysis. Despite 
the cogent arguments in favour of a holistic approach to language study, linguistic 
models of scientific writing which explain the genre as an exercise in grammar 
mechanics and relate its understanding to questions of competence, in every-day 
speech, are still influential. The descriptions proposed give little weight to the role 
that discerning minds, technological inventiveness, mathematical concepts 
combined with experimental interaction, and operative procedures of specialist 
communities have in modern science and its discursive practices. Occurrence of 
nominals, in text fragments, is framed as evidence of a strategy used by scientists to 
objectify nature, depersonalise speech and impede lay people from understanding 
their texts (cf. Halliday & Martin, 1993). The critique of specialist writing is 
admittedly issue oriented. It relies on intra-linguistic observations and constrains 
epistemic, pragmatic and semantic aspects of text production and interpretation 
within logocentric theories. 
 
The present paper suggests that the objective nature of specialist prose arises from 
the fact that it relates to phenomena, and practices external to linguistic-system 
conventions. The discussion traces the roots of the scientific approach to 
knowledge and discourse back to Aristotle’s philosophy and speech categories. It 
then frames scientific progress as a cumulative enterprise which advances through 
the contributions of independent minds, investigation of phenomena, development 
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of instruments and techniques, creation of verbal and non-verbal codes sustained by 
pondered debates. The account demonstrates that, although grammatical 
competence is indispensable in discursive acts, the meaning of the propositions 
occurring in specialist texts is determined by extra-linguistic factors. Moreover, in 
science, the reliability of the affirmations and claims do not depend on the 
judgement of one individual, but on the inter-subjective agreement of a community 
of researchers sharing a number of material and conceptual tools. These common 
elements are used in the same manner by the community members in order to 
verify propositions, test claims, repeat experiments, improve and expand existing 
knowledge.  
 
Successful communication in science depends on the intertwining of all these 
factors in a dynamic texture. This makes the genre complex, multi-levelled, and 
permeated with ethnographic strands (cf. Hymes 1974). It is therefore concluded 
that idealistic framing of scientific communication should be invigorated with 
principles and suggestions from both applied linguistics and applied pragmatics. 
 
 
2. The rise and consolidation of scientific discourse 
Scientific inquiry has been defined as a dialogue with nature which must follow 
systematic procedures of investigation and draw on mathematical, geometric and 
verbal codes. To investigate nature, a researcher must know what questions to ask, 
how to interpret and verify possible answers and how to present findings to peers 
for reproduction and verification. These heuristic operations rely on cumulative 
knowledge and are public (cf. Cooper 1969). Therefore, anyone can contribute to 
scientific progress provided that s/he has the required capabilities, namely 
disciplinary knowledge, familiarity with instruments, procedural techniques and 
verbal and non-verbal codes of communication. Since physical phenomena are 
complex and can have a multiplicity of causes and effects, a scientist usually 
investigates only one aspect of nature rather than addressing the whole of reality. 
Obviously, the subject chosen for investigation and the current state of knowledge 
on the issue of interest influence the operational criteria adopted, the propositions 
discussed and the validity of the affirmations made. 
 
Science progresses through a dialectic interaction with many protagonists, namely 
the researcher, nature, instruments, experts sharing knowledge about the specific 
and interrelated field of inquiry. Besides theoretical and factual aspects, the 
members of a specialist community share knowledge of techniques for measuring 
variables, calculating relations and mapping dynamic aspects of phenomena. They 
must also be conversant with patterns of representation which rely on verbal, 
mathematical, geometric and graphic channels. The latter are used to analyse and 
describe phenomena and to report procedures and findings.  
 
Objectivity in science goes well beyond the arrangement of formal structures. It is a 
pragmatic approach which, among other things, allows scientists to “... build 
arguments that coerce, by their cogency, the agreement of all who will attend to 
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them” (Booth 1967: 141). The roots of scientific discourse trace back to the 
principles which were fathered by Aristotle (384-322 BC) and have contributed to 
the development of scientific knowledge as well as founded the philosophy, 
language and practices of science. 
 
Aristotle acknowledged the importance of verbal forms in social, economic and 
academic interactions. He argued, however, that speech should also be framed in 
consideration of the cognitive and pragmatic activities devised by mankind to 
contribute both to the welfare of the people and to the meaning-making process. In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that it is not words that have meaning, but 
the speaker and listener who mean something by their use of words. Therefore, he 
entrusts people with the epistemic and semiotic processes underlying 
communication. The philosopher-scientist argues against theories which give 
verbal symbols permanent grammatical categories and attribute them ideal values. 
He demonstrates that the grammatical class of a lexical item is relative to its 
position and function in a sentence, whereas the significance of each linguistic form 
depends on speech situation, concrete evidence, crafts and disciplinary domains (cf. 
Aristotle 1998). In the same treatise, Aristotle draws attention to the different uses 
and aims of language. He distinguishes ‘apophantic’ propositions, based on 
probative statements, from ‘emotive’ and ‘rhetorical’ speech forms which rely on 
emotions and commentary. Through his discussions, Aristotle shifts the focus of 
language study from form to content and relates speech events to context and 
interactants. Thus, he anticipates notions of speech act, semantic and pragmatic 
principles, which have been debated and developed in depth in the last decades. 
 
In Posterior Analytics, a treatise devoted to science, Aristotle states that “every 
method and every knowledge starts from previous knowledge” (Aristotle 1924:I-
18, 81a, 35). He defines scientific research as a journey from what is more obscure 
by nature towards what is more clear and knowable through investigation. 
Thereafter, he roots this process of discovery in the intertwining of experience, 
sensation and observation of natural phenomena with inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Aristotle then states that scientific explanations of natural processes 
should be filtered through a discussion among people sharing concepts and know-
how in the particular area of knowledge or craft. He explains that the dialectic 
process will ensure that the claim made be validated either by everyone or by the 
majority of the wise. In this framework, the members of a task-based community 
transform, convert and develop existing knowledge through a dialogic approach. 
The latter involves the researcher-reporter, systematic analysis of physical events, 
considerations and contributions of other experts in the field of knowledge. The 
debate will, thus, result in epistemic, dialectic and pragmatic expansion for all the 
participants. 
 
Aristotle names the discourse of scientific inquiry Episthemonikos, i.e., 
knowledge making discourse. He associates this speech type with the purpose of 
understanding, explaining, classifying natural processes as well as establishing 
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inter-relations between phenomena, objects and organisms observable in the 
physical world (cf. Adler 2002). 
 
In Aristotle’s framework, Episthemonikos has the following protagonists: 
 
Users  Field-experts discussing evidence and exchanging opinions; 
Ends  Discovering causes and properties of physical phenomena; 
Proofs  Observation and comparison of different views on a specific 
subject drawing on evidence, reasoning, analogy and concrete 
examples; 
Time  Present related to stative and ergative categories and 
propositions. 
 
Episthemonikos differs from the discourse types described by Aristotle in his 
Rhetoric (cf. Tarantino 1998), in so far as both the reporter and the reader have an 
active role in the meaning-making process; the topic is external to the interlocutors; 
and the evidence is based on observation of concrete facts supported by logical 
inference and reasoning. These elements allow for the content of this variety to be 
in constant evolution. 
 
Aristotle applied the method of investigation and discourse he had theorised in a 
series of books that form the foundation of biology. The most well known is his 
Historia Animalium which describes the life style of hundreds of species of animals 
“… how they breed and reproduce, where they are found, and how they interact” 
(Adler 2002:22). He based his descriptions on direct observation of living creatures 
and dissection of cadavers as well as on discussions “… with philosophers, 
fishermen, farmers, travelers and other people with first hand-knowledge of 
animals” (Adler 2002:23).  
 
Aristotle’s empirical treatise on natural philosophy and discourse were seminal for 
the scientific revolution in the Renaissance. The enlightened men who, in the 
seventeenth century, gave course to modern science wanted to organise knowledge 
on logical bases and to explain natural phenomena and their relations drawing on 
systematic and factual evidence. Thus, they adopted and adapted the speech genre 
which could best help them: “... to apply Reason to Imagination for the better 
moving of the will” (Bacon 1955:X). 
 
Through their empirical work and discussions, Bacon (1561-1626), Galileo (1564-
1642), Descartes (1596-1650) and Newton (1642-1727) innovated Aristotle’s 
approach to knowledge. They fused philosophic and empirical strategies with 
techniques from mathematics and geometry. They argued that investigation and 
discussions of natural phenomena could be improved, firstly, with the use of 
technical tools, which could extend the senses; secondly, with the reproduction of 
phenomena under study in experimental conditions; and, thirdly, with the 
validation of results through further experiments enriched with reasoning and 
discussions with peers (cf. Galileo 1938). 
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Galileo is recognised as the first scientist who actually added perspective to 
Episthemonikos or rational speech and adapted it for the needs of modern science. 
He stated that the purpose of scientific work and argumentation is not to make man 
virtuous, but wise. He argued that, in order to understand natural phenomena, one 
should not confront the opinion of authorities, but observe nature directly and 
reproduce the process through experimental means, measure its physical properties 
and open the argumentation, results and claims for public discussion. Galileo 
defended the right of science to investigate, explain, order and classify the 
phenomena and laws which govern nature. He ventured into this enterprise by 
observing physical events and establishing their properties in relation to space-time 
co-ordinates which he established through the use of appropriate instruments. Thus, 
he introduced a new method for doing and discussing science (cf. Tarantino 1999). 
 
In the Galilean method, intellectual and manual faculties have a primary role. The 
main elements of the dialogic interaction which frames scientific research, are in 
fact the inquiring mind, the acting individual, nature and a method of investigation 
shared by the disciplinary community members. The latter will ascertain the 
reliability of the propositions and claims reported by the follow researcher. In 
addition, they will judge whether the task has been conducted according to 
accepted rules so that the investigation can be successfully repeated (cf. Galileo 
1938). Over time, the systematic working-model originated by Galileo has been 
improved and its current guiding elements are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Observation strategy in science 
 
The heuristic activities reported in the diagram, or more precisely the epistemic, 
semantic and pragmatic content embodied by the various elements of the decisional 
course, highlight the dialectic process which establish between mental, dialogic and 
experimental tasks in the various phases of a scientific inquiry. Obviously, the 
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current status of each element will influence the thematic and functional units of a 
specialist report as well as modulate the researcher’s stance. Following Galileo’s 
teachings, the discussion of scientific findings must be enriched with visual 
representations of the process investigated and of the instruments used. 
Consequently, these elements add other thematisation foci to the text (cf. Lemke 
1998). 
 
 
3. From shadows to light 
Human kind has always been keen to understand natural phenomena and to employ 
the information obtained through experience and observation for useful purposes. A 
telling example of these characteristics is related to phenomena produced by 
sunlight. Primitive societies learned to use the shadow cast by the sun at different 
times of the day to establish both the parts of the day and the season of the year. 
This information was then  used to organise daily-work routine and to plan 
migration and agricultural schedules. In order to have more objective information, 
they devised the gnomon or sundial which is considered the earliest instrument 
found in almost every culture (Fig 2.). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Primitive tribesman measuring the shadow of a gnomon 
 
Although very simple, the gnomon was a useful tool in the development of 
scientific knowledge. In ancient Egypt, Eratosthenes (220–140 BC) used the device 
to gauge the angle of the shadow cast by the sun in different locations and at 
different times of the day. With the help of a human pacer - a man who was trained 
to pace out distances by walking in steps of equal length, counting as he went - 
Article by Maria Tarantino 
 75
Eratosthenes then calculated the difference in the shadow cast at the same time of 
day in two different locations and the distance between the two places.  
 
 
 
Fig 3: Eratosthenes’ experiment 
 
He used the information collected in geometric projections which led him to 
compute the circumference of the earth, with surprising precision considering the 
simple method used, and to speculate about the planet spherical shape and other 
properties. 
 
In 1610, Galileo observed shadows on the moon surface by means of his telescope. 
Drawing on the teaching of Arab astronomers and Euclidean geometry, he 
projected the shadows through geometrical figures and calculated their dimensions 
(Fig. 4). From the results, he postulated that the ‘heavenly body’, whose surface 
was believed to be smooth as a mirror, was covered by mountains and craters 
similar to those existing on the earth. With admirable art, he mapped the moon 
surface (Fig. 5). He then extended his research to other planets and defended his 
discoveries and claims with considerable rhetorical and argumentative skills. 
Through his discoveries, Galileo started the Copernican revolution which 
influenced changes in human perception and in every branch of knowledge and 
discourse (cf. Adler 2002). 
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     Galileo’s projections of the shadows    
         detected on the moon surface                                  Galileo’s map of the moon surface 
                      Fig. 4                   Fig. 5 
 
Following the Galilean method and using the information and diagrams found in 
the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Newton conceived his 
Principia, the treatise in which he developed the law of universal gravitation (cf. 
Drake 1980). Then, he brought about one of the most fruitful innovations in 
philosophic and scientific thought. Newton was curious about the nature of light 
and colour, thus, in a series of brilliant experiments, he passed a ray of white light 
through a glass prism and detected shadows of different colours projected onto a 
screen. Through geometric representations and mathematical measurements, he 
identified the properties of each shade and defined the colour spectrum (Fig. 6). 
Newton confirmed his findings by recombining the colours of the dispersed light 
through an inverted prism whereby he obtained white light again. Thus, he 
hypothesised that white light is composed of all the colours in the spectrum (cf. 
Newton 1952). 
 
The technique devised by Newton and the conclusions he reached opened science 
to infinite horizons. The development of spectroscopy and the application of its 
principles and techniques in investigating the macro- and micro-world has changed 
knowledge about sidereal bodies, living organisms and minerals and has greatly 
changed as well as expanded linguistic repertoires.  
 
          Fig. 6 
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Following the procedures suggested by Galileo, Newton and Bacon, scientists have 
devised complex instruments, concepts, and terms and brought their inquiry into: 
 
- … the realm of the directly accessible material world of objects and 
properties that can be sensed unaided. 
- … the realm of those things which can be accessed through 
instrumentation. These are initially proposed through logical 
reasoning. 
- … the realm of those things which are beyond sensory experience and 
instrumentation but are accessed through logical reasoning alone. 
       (Monk 1994:131) 
 
Information has accumulated on the bodies that populate the universe, on physical 
phenomena which occur on our planet, on the constituents of life and matter, on the 
causes of diseases, and on their treatment. The most spectacular contributions have 
been made in the subatomic realm. Even in this enterprise, shadows have had a 
major role in shedding light on fundamental questions about the cosmos, matter, 
life, and evolution.  
 
The blotches left by uranium salt on a photographic plate, first observed by Henry 
Becquerel (1852-1908), led Marie Curie (1867-1934) to speculate about the 
possible release of energy from the metal. To verify her suppositions, she carried 
out experiments which confirmed her hypothesis and opened new avenues of 
thought, research and applications. The scientist’s creative mind not only 
contributed to the discovery of subatomic particles and their interactions thus 
establishing nuclear physics as a new discipline, but also enriched the scientific 
vocabulary and language in general. M. Curie coined terms such as ‘radioactive’, 
‘radioactivity’, ‘disintegration’ and ‘transmutation’ to describe the phenomena she 
had observed through her experiments and applications (cf. Adler 2002). In their 
turn, these concepts have led to the generation of other semantic fields. 
 
The episodes which led to the detection, identification and determination of the 
deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA) molecule can offer a striking example of how 
scientific knowledge advances as well as of how new verbal and non-verbal codes 
are generated. A brief reflection on the step by step contributions which brought 
about the characterization of the DNA molecular configuration can also give 
stringent evidence that science is a cumulative and cooperative enterprise. 
 
3.1 Dialogic journey to the origin of life 
The first step in the definition of the basic elements of life came with the finding by 
Hooke (1635-1703) that the structure of cork was composed by walled cavities 
which he termed ‘cells’ (cf. Nurse 2000). With the development of more powerful 
microscopes, biologists and botanists gathered evidence on the similarities between 
the basic constituents of plants and animals and became more and more convinced 
that all organisms are composed of cells. Then, in 1859 the physiologist Virchow 
(1821-1902) postulated the now famous: ‘Omnis cellula e cellula’ that is,‘ every 
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cell comes from cells’ thus establishing cells at the core of all vital processes. This 
launched researchers into a relentless quest to understand and reveal the cell 
mechanism and features. 
 
The nucleic acid, now termed DNA, was first detected in puss cells in 1869. 
However, at the time, biochemistry was in its infancy, crystallography had not been 
incorporated into the life sciences and no microscope powerful enough had been 
devised to identify the structural conformation of the acid. The ‘tetranucleotide’ 
structure or chain structure of the organic compounds constituting the molecule was 
tentatively proposed in 1919. Then, with advancements in biochemistry, the acid 
influence on heritable changes was hypothesised in 1928. The chemical 
composition and genetic properties of the molecule were finally identified in 1944 
(cf. Adler 2002). However, the structural characteristic of the molecule remained a 
mystery until 1952 when Rosalind E. Franklin identified two forms of DNA which 
she termed A and B. The skilful use of X-ray diffraction techniques and principles 
helped the young scientist to obtain an excellent X-ray diffraction pattern of 
structure B (cf. Franklin 1953:740). It was the interpretation of the shadows, found 
on the photographic plates obtained by Franklin (Fig. 7), sustained by geometric 
intuition, that led Watson and Crick to devise the double helix structure in 1953 
(Fig. 8) and to postulate other characteristics of the molecule (cf. Watson & Crick 
1953).  
 
 
                                Fig. 7                                                     Fig. 8 
           R. Franklin: X-ray diffraction image      Watson & Crick: diagrammatic representation 
        of the deoxyribose nucleic acid molecule                 of the double-helix DNA structure 
 
Nature, April, 25th 1953 
 
The pattern they suggested drew on mathematical and geometric representation and 
on chemical descriptions of the acid which had tentatively been proposed by 
members of the research community through the previous decades. Watson and 
Crick refined the model, suggested the double helix structure and focused on some 
convincing implications of their representation. Yet the double helix proposal 
remained speculative until 1961 when the DNA molecule was sequenced and 
reproduced in laboratory experiments and the characteristics of its genetic material 
were determined (cf. Olby 2003). Since then, molecular biology and genetics have 
broken new grounds in the understanding of biological molecules, their influences 
Article by Maria Tarantino 
 79
and control with consequent changes and advancements in most fields of research. 
The discovery and description of the DNA structure show that science progresses 
through gradual approximation, partial understanding and evolving definitions. 
 
The tentative nature of scientific claims and discourse is well exemplified by 
Watson and Crick’s speculative statement about their model:  
 
It has not escaped our notice that the specific pairing we have postulated 
immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic 
material.  
(cf. Watson & Crick 1953:737) 
 
More than demonstrating humbleness on the part of the authors, the statement 
intends to signal to the community both the tentative hypothesis they were working 
on and the possibilities for future developments it implied. The expression also 
suggests that, in writing scientific reports, researchers obey Grice’s cooperative 
principles. To this purpose, the morphosyntactic, semantic and rhetorical choices 
they make are in accordance with the categories of quantity, quality, relation and 
manner (cf. Grice 1975).  
 
The degree to which Grice’s maxims hold in a particular community and in relation 
to particular sphere of knowledge is thus important for the understanding and 
description of discourse patterns. In scientific writing, the category of quality: “Try 
to make your contribution one that is true …” and its maxim “Do not say that for 
which you lack adequate evidence.” (Grice 1975:46) appear to have a relevant role. 
The importance of this maxim is highlighted by Franklin’s comment about the 
effective knowledge of the DNA structure in 1953: 
 
…the X-ray evidence cannot be taken, at present, as direct proof that the 
structure is helical, other considerations discussed below make the 
existence of a helical structure highly probable. 
(Franklin 1953:740) 
 
The scientific community was aware that many problems needed to be solved 
before the helical structure could be accepted as a fact. Scientists learn the 
principles of the scientific method through their academic training. At the same 
time, they become aware both of the probabilistic nature of scientific claims and of 
the need to use concrete arguments in describing findings and procedures. They are 
also taught that floundering the cooperative principle maxims can bring about loss 
of credibility for the individual researcher as well as cause a waste of time for the 
community. 
 
The researcher-author knows who his/her interlocutors will be and writes with 
specific purposes in mind. S/he is aware that the fate of his/her work depends on 
the fruitfulness of the findings, or better, that the audience is more interested in 
facts and ideas which can improve methods of analysis and instruments than in 
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‘empty words’. In discussing his/her research, the researcher, tries thus to avoid 
ambiguity and aid comprehension by defining technical terms carefully, by using 
examples, analogies and imaginative expressions. Besides appropriate language 
scientific communication relies on illustrations which can clarify techniques, tools 
and images which are too complex to be conveyed by linguistic structures alone 
(cf. Alley 1987).  
 
 
4. Toiling for terms and discourse adequacy 
Scientists are aware of the importance that the written and oral modes have in their 
work. Thus, they toil to find precise verbal forms to express their thoughts and 
describe their findings. They also know that appropriate use of language forms is 
fundamental for effective communication as well as a means for knowledge 
development. Lavoisier (1743-1794) states this clearly: 
 
Languages are intended, not only to express by signs, as is commonly 
supposed, the ideas and images of the mind; but are also analytical 
methods, by means of which, we advance from the known to the 
unknown, and to a certain degree in the manner of mathematicians… 
(Lavoisier 1788:4-5) 
 
This awareness about the importance of language makes scientists particularly 
attentive in naming physical entities and in organizing explanations about the 
nature, causes, effects and consequences of physical phenomena (cf. Hacking 
1997). In every branch of science, the choice and/or creation of technical terms to 
refer to either to concrete objects and their properties, or to theoretical entities is a 
slow, complex intellectual and semiotic process which may build on the 
contribution of experts in different fields as well as draw on discussions which may 
extend over centuries (cf. Duhem 1989). For instance, the coining of the term 
‘oxygen’ by Lavoisier evolved from discussions and experiments. The gas which 
had attracted the attention of many scholar, had first been named ‘fat earth’, then 
re-termed ‘phlogistone’ and finally ‘dephlogisticated air’. The debate had engaged 
scientists from different linguistic background for over two centuries when through 
appropriate experimentation, measurements and verification was satisfactory 
defined and given the appropriate name (cf. Tarantino 1999).  
 
In scientific domains, the choice of terms is founded on Aristotle’s categories and 
relates to meaning which depends on physical visual, tactile, motor and other 
properties of objects or entities referred to. The term may reflect: 
what (or Substance), how large (that is Quantity), what sort of thing (that 
is Quality), related to what (or Relation), where (that is Place), when (or 
Time), in what attitude (Posture, Position), how circumstances (state of 
Condition), how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what 
suffering (Affection).  
(Aristotle’s Categories IV) 
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The Greek philosopher applied these categories in deciding the names for the over 
six hundred animals and plants that he studied and classified. Thus, he started both 
biology and systematics. With the subdivision of science into many branches, 
scientists have devised systematic approaches of nomenclature and terminology 
which reflect observed morphologic aspects and/or physico chemical- properties of 
the entities studied and classified.  
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Fig. 9: Components: semantic interaction and conceptual change 
 
 
The meaning refinement and term definition, besides direct observation and 
verification of the phenomenon studied, rests on a dialectic exchange between the 
components of the knowledge advancement effort (Fig. 9). The Subject (S) is the 
object of study for example ‘common salt’, in technical expressions, sodium 
chloride (NaCl). The Tools (T) are the intellectual strategies, operative steps and 
instruments used to establish and verify the properties of the chemical compound. 
The Researcher/Interpreter (R) is the generator of the evolutionary process. In the 
investigation and description of the substance, R draws on knowledge from 
interrelated disciplinary domains as chemistry, crystallography, physics, 
mathematics and geometry as well as from X-ray diffraction techniques, previous 
and on-going discussions about the substance.  
 
The state of knowledge of each component will influence discourse production and 
interpretation by governing the cognitive aspects of communication which are 
responsible for non-linguistic factors of coding and de-coding, such as implicature, 
entailment, presuppositions, speech acts and text structures (cf. Levinson 1987). 
Clearly, scientific progress builds on existing disciplinary knowledge and relies on 
the researcher’s mental and manual abilities. Through problem posing and solution-
seeking strategies, the scientist aims at discovering new data which prove or 
disprove the adequacy of existing patterns of analysis and/or theories regarding 
specific aspects of nature, and when possible improve data and models. 
 
In the quest for a better understanding of reality, however, the scientist must always 
bear in mind “... that the ground of our opinion is far more custom and example 
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than any certain knowledge” (Descartes 1967:703). Consequently, to avoid 
discrepancies and errors due to subjective influences, the researcher has to adhere 
closely to the model of analysis accepted by the scientific community, back up 
his/her perceptions with quantitative and qualitative data and support his/her 
inferences by factual proofs. In other words, to provide grounds for the claim 
advanced, s/he must separate feelings and desires from the findings reported and 
present the discussion in “...an environment that he objectifies in the third-person 
attitude of an observer” (Habermas 1979:66). 
 
In this effort, scientists must also take into account that ‘the observed system’ and 
‘the observer’ are interdependent entities. To avoid covert influences, they must 
abide by the principles of science and report exact quantitative measurements and 
true to fact claims. At the same time, they must adhere to the principles of rhetoric 
which demand that “…the audience be informed as efficiently as possible, and that 
the reporters stay honest” (Alley 1987:15). In this perspective, the researcher will 
communicate his/her findings through: “Constative speech acts (which) contain the 
offer to recur if necessary to the ‘experiential source’ from which the speaker draws 
the ‘certainty’ that his statement is true” (Habermas 1979:63-64, original italics). In 
order to reflect ‘tacit knowledge’ and to display evidence, the propositions must be 
related to one another and to the world they represent. Hence, through factual or 
content- and language-true statements, (cf. Preti, 1953) the researcher tries to 
secure transparency to the investigation and cognitive validity to each step of 
his/her presentation. 
 
Even though touching on a limited number of scientific innovations, the 
considerations proposed above demonstrate that scientific progress builds on shared 
knowledge, intelligible information and repeatable experiments. The Galilean 
method has actually established scientific research as a ‘public activity’ as well as 
strengthened the role of the audience in the communication process. It is the 
audience that will provide validation for the evidence presented and accord 
consensus to the claim. Through further investigation and discussion, the 
disciplinary community will then endeavour to improve the findings and/or change 
them (cf. Toulmin, 1972). The discussants can contribute to the improvement of a 
report by offering informed criticism since they have a thorough understanding of 
the subject matter and of the material and instruments used for the investigation. At 
the same time, they can acquire knowledge and be guided to setting new problems 
and making new discoveries. This combination of activities makes scientific 
discourse a heuristic enterprise where all the protagonists can participate to 
meaning, knowledge and language evolution. Each member of a scientific 
community can partake in the ongoing discussion and open new paths of thought, 
research and communication. 
 
5. Issue-oriented frames of scientific discourse 
In recent decades the language of science has interested researchers of different 
disciplines among which theoretical and applied linguists. The latter have 
attempted to provide models of analysis and description which have tended to 
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emphasise the role of formal structures in text organisation while neglecting the 
contribution of extra-linguistic strands in the process of discourse construction and 
interpretation. A most singular description of scientific discourse is the one 
proposed by the systemic functional linguistic (SFL) school, admittedly “… 
evolved as a tool for participating in political processes” (Halliday & Martin 
1993:22). The purpose of the linguistic investigation is “not just to remaking 
science as a humane endeavour, but also developing new analytic perspectives for 
critiquing science”(Halliday & Martin 1993:x). The idealistic approach suggested 
relies on the deconstruction of fragments of scientific texts: 
 
… deliberately sidestepping the question of the role of mental organs in 
human behaviour—but with semiosis as the resolution of engagement of 
physical biological and social resources (i.e., consciousness) in our 
species. 
(Halliday & Martin 1993:23, original parentheses) 
 
The analysis proposed is presented as a means both to disambiguate the meaning of 
terms and to understand “how the patterns relate to what the scientists were trying 
to achieve” (Halliday & Martin 1993:82). In the descriptions elaborated, the role 
that independent minds, inventiveness and manual skills have had in the 
development of scientific discourse is underplayed while the occurrence of targeted 
nominals is emphasised and considered as a mark of elitism. The ‘syndrome’ which 
characterises scientific discourse is localised in the occurrence of terms such as 
radiation, transmutation and refraction, which are classed as derivational nouns in 
theoretical grammars. On the basis of this classification, these terms are described 
as deviations from everyday language structures and then defined as ‘virtual 
entities’, ‘dummy things’ used for taxonomic purposes (cf. Halliday & Martin 
1993). 
 
The definition is elaborated in absence of ethnographic considerations and with 
little reference to the scientific and linguistic principles which govern lexical 
choices and determine meaning in science. According to Lavoisier, the scientist 
who systematised chemical concepts and terminology in reference to evidence, in 
scientific contexts terms as sublimation, crystallization, distillation, condensation, 
signify both the transformation of a substance and the end products of a process (cf. 
Lavoisier 1788). Such expressions should thus be classified grammatically as 
nouns which refer to ongoing processes having observable causes and effects or 
better as ‘second order entities’ which, as explained by Lyons, have observable 
results and temporal duration (cf. Lyons 1994:445). To categorise the concepts 
embodied in terms which have visible effects as “grammatical metaphors” or 
virtual items used by the scientist to construe reality as an edifice of ‘static things’ 
seems not to be adequate to improve understanding either of the terms or the 
discourse genre. 
 
Good scientists are usually very accurate in choosing word which can depict better 
the phenomenon or process they are describing and in forming propositions which 
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can clearly represent perceptual strategies and conceptual relations woven in their 
texts. They are aware of the importance that words have in representing the 
sequence of a phenomenon, in calling forth concepts and in expressing them. At the 
same time, they know that in writing, interpreting and validating research reports:  
 
“It is impossible to dissociate language from science and science from 
language…”  
  (Lavoisier 1788:288).  
 
As explained above, in science, the creation of terms and the organisation of texts 
is a dialectic game involving many partners: natural processes, the researcher-
inquirer, other members of a research community, and instruments used to 
investigate physical objects. Scientific discourse relies on the solutions of 
mathematical equations which can only be approached through the written mode. 
The discourse of science should be framed not as a monologue, or assimilated to 
oral speech, but as a debate which, through the written mode, takes place between 
experts who share know-how, interests, and purposes of their disciplinary area and 
who may belong to different generations and cultures. Scientists do not create 
knowledge ex-novo, they reflect on what is known and through intellectual and 
manual activities they transform, convert, and develop information. In so doing, 
they enrich the epistemic, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions of language and 
communication. To make effective understanding of the genre solely dependent on 
grammar mechanics trivialises the efforts made by humankind to develop language 
structures adequate to refer to the external world and to respond to their intent and 
purposes. 
 
Scientific discourse, as any discourse type linked to a profession or trade, should 
not be equated to everyday speech or popular-science prose. The content matter of 
specialist reports builds on different sources of knowledge, hence, it cannot be 
properly understood by people not trained in the specific field of research and 
application. Lay people can repeat technical terms in speech or writing. However, 
since they are unaware of the non-verbal dimensions which technical expressions 
embody, they lack the knowledge required to evaluate the reliability of a scientific 
text, criticise or expand its content. In other words, they will not be able to 
appreciate the specific information that the text builds on and the expectations it 
implies. The objectivity of scientific reports does not depend on idiosyncratic 
choices on the part of the writers, it arises instead from the philosophy and method 
of science and from the purposes shared by members of disciplinary communities. 
Logocentric descriptions of scientific discourse which constrain science within 
abstract linguistic rules and ideological frames miss accounting for the endeavours 
that, through the ages, generations of researchers, from different cultural 
backgrounds, have made to liberate human thought and knowledge from such 
constrains in order to better understand nature and society and to improve work and 
living conditions.  
 
 
Article by Maria Tarantino 
 85
6. Conclusions 
The study has demonstrated that advancement in science is driven by reasoning, 
doing, making, arguing and intervening (cf. Hacking 1997). Researchers intervene 
in setting conditions to recreate phenomena, in determining their properties, in 
mapping their structure through geometric representations and in naming them. 
They make observations, draw inferences, carry out experiments, manipulate 
materials, take measurements, create conditions, set-up situations, and construct 
instruments with varying degrees of precision. Their quest to better understand 
nature is a never ending enterprise which builds on approximation and partial 
explanations. Each researcher is aware that scientific truth is never final; what s/he 
aspires for is ‘moral truth’, a truth which is relative to the status of the research 
components (cf. Newton 1952). As a consequence, scientific activities, findings 
and claims are represented through verbal and non-verbal codes that are tentative 
and in constant evolution. 
 
Science is universal for its method is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual inquirer; objective since it tries to be in agreement with the facts of 
nature; intersubjective since its claims rest on consensus by disciplinary 
communities; progressive since subsequent development of scientific knowledge 
builds on accumulated knowledge.  
 
More reliable models of scientific discourse cannot be based solely on the morpho-
syntactic forms featured in sample texts, they should be in light of suggestions 
coming from philosophers of language, pragmatists, relevance theorists and LSP 
researchers. These scholars have shifted the attention of language studies from 
grammar forms to the people who use them for actual interactions. They have 
opened linguistic studies to aspects of meaning which arise from extra-linguistic 
strands of discourse. To this purpose, they have separated ‘mere speech’ from 
informative discourse practises. On the one hand, their discussions emphasise the 
prevalent social function of everyday conversation and its feeble links to truth-
conditional requirements. On the other, they attribute discursive events 
propositional and heuristic propensities and link the process of communication to 
observable phenomena, epistemic, cultural and operative worlds. These variables 
should be included in discourse analysis so that the contribution of humans who 
think, act and discuss in order to understand nature, improve living and work 
condition and facilitate communication may have the attention it deserves in the 
language sciences.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Epistemic and dialectic pathways  
to knowledge, meaning and language advancement 
 
Maria Tarantino  
Dipartimento Interateneo di Fisica, Bari, Italy 
 
 
The paper emphasises the propositional and heuristic nature of scientific discourse and 
relates the meaning-making process to epistemic, procedural and dialogic strategies 
shared by members of disciplinary communities. It suggests that this sphere of 
communication is in constant evolution due to the informative and innovative thrust 
that each contribution provides to a common explanatory endeavour. 
The discussion traces the foundation of the knowledge-making approach to discourse 
in Aristotle’s work. The Greek philosopher defines scientific research as a journey 
from what is more obscure by nature towards what is more clear and knowable 
through investigation. He roots the process of discovery in the intertwining of 
experience and observation of phenomena with actions, cognitive and verbal strands 
internal to disciplinary worlds. Moreover, Aristotle maintains that advancement in any 
field should be filtered through a discussion among people sharing concepts and know-
how in the particular area of knowledge or craft. In this framework, the members of a 
task-based community transform, convert and develop existent knowledge through a 
dialogic approach which involves the individual researcher, systematic analysis of 
physical events, considerations and contributions of other experts in the field. 
The study then explains that since the Renaissance, scientists have followed and 
expanded Aristotle’s approach to knowledge and discourse. The advancement has 
thriven on the fusion of empirical and scientific research sustained by mathematics, 
geometry, technical props and systematic experiments. This method has rendered the 
investigation, modelling and description of natural phenomena more reliable and open 
to verification by the expert-community. At the same time, it has enriched scientific 
terms, texts and language with disciplinary semantic and pragmatic dimensions, thus, 
making the genre universal, objective, rational, true and open ended. 
Through reference to actual scientific discoveries, the paper demonstrates that 
technical concepts, terms and texts build on accumulated knowledge, independent 
thinking, principles, theories, practices, verbal and non-verbal codes of research 
domains. It indicates that scientific writing has its own goals, problems and constraints 
which rule questions of precision, clarity, truthfulness, familiarity, imagery and 
fluidity of expression. The discussions provide support for models of language study 
which challenge linguistic determinism and argue for descriptive approaches which 
include humans who think, act and discuss in order to understand nature, improve 
living and work conditions and facilitate communication. 
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